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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RURAL 
DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IN SOUTH ASIA 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents GLS estimates for a regression model to 
explain rural deposits in India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
Per capita rural income, bank density and real rate of interest 
paid on deposits were significant variables. Access to bank 
branches is important because of the transaction costs of 
making and withdrawing deposits. 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on rural finance in developing countries 
has been dominated during the past couple of decades by a pre-
occupation with extending loans to farmers. Policies have been 
implemented to push cheap loans into rural areas, and to assure 
lenders of adequate funds for such loans. Funds have frequently 
been provided through re~iscount facilities of the Central Bank 
(often through concessionally-priced funds from international 
donors), or through regulations requiring financial institutions 
to either lend directly to farmers or make deposits with special-
ized farm lenders. Too frequently, deposit mobilization has been 
the forgotten half of financial intermediation (Vogel). 
Three factors h~ve contributed to a fundamental rethinking 
of rural finance. First, the failures and distortions of the 
cheap rural credit strategy have been amply documented (Adams, 
Graham and von Pischke). Second, domestic resource mobilization 
is becoming more urgent out of necessity. Many countries face 
greater difficulty today in obtaining cheap foreign funds because 
they are already heavily indebted and the international sources 
simply don't have as many funds (Abbott). Third, the once 
pessimistic view that rural people are too poor to save has been 
challenged and low rural savings rates have been attributed more 
to inappropriate policies than to poverty (Adams). 
Although the nature of the savings function in developing 
countries has been studied (Mikesell and Zinser), there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence on financial savings. 
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Most studies of the determinants of rural financial savings 
have intuitive appeal but lack empirical testing (Dell'Amore). 
This paper presents some results obtained from a study of 
rural deposits in four South Asian countries: India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. They were selected because they have 
emphasized rural banking, they have strong similarities in their 
economic, cultural and political background, and they furnish 
reasonably consistent data. The paper includes a short discus-
sion of major issues related to rural deposit mobilization, the 
empirical model, some results, and conclusions. 
DETERMINANTS OF RURAL DEPOSITS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
voluntary household savings in financial institutions 
represent an important issue for research because, unlike 
business and government savings, household savings are gener-
ally channeled into investments via financial markets. Rural 
financial intermediation may have an important impact on growth 
because in the early stages of development agriculture must 
supply resources for its own development and for other sectors. 
There is considerable growth potential for financial intermedia-
tion in many rural areas because they are either unbanked or 
lack attractive financial instruments. 
The supply of funds provided by rural households to finan-
cial institutions depends on financial and nonfinancial factors. 
The most important nonfinancial factor may be income. The higher 
the income of rural households, the greater will be their ability 
to acquire temporary surpluses which can be deposited. Further-
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more, the higher the income level, the greater will be the need 
to hold financial assets as a means of payment. Also income 
should be correlated with a wide variety of other factors related 
to banking such as monetization, urbanization and education. 
Conveniently located deposit-taking institutions that cater 
to customers are likely to be an important financial factor 
affecting rural deposits. No studies were found that analyze 
transaction costs of making and withdrawing deposits in develop-
ing countries. Borrowing cost studies, however, show that 
noninterest costs may be as high or higher than interest charges, 
especially for small loans {Cuevas and Graham). These costs are 
high because of the explicit and implicit costs of travel and 
time spent in making several trips to the lender to negotiate a 
loan. It should be expected, therefore, that transaction costs 
will also be high for deposits. Conveniently located financial 
institutions can significantly reduce transaction costs and, 
thereby, increase the net return earned on deposits. 
Besides reducing transaction costs, an extensive network of 
financial institutions may break down social barriers and speed 
the adoption of banking habits (Porter). Rural people need time 
to adjust to the idea of substituting formal institutions for 
face-to-face relations. Exposure to a neighborhood bank, getting 
acquainted with bank staff who may also live in the neighborhood, 
and observing others safely using banks may encourage potential 
depositors to place some savings in a financial institution. 
The level and variability of real interest rates is the most 
controversial financial factor related to savings behavior. At 
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the theoretical level, the income and substitution effects of 
interest rate changes need to be evaluated. Some studies have 
shown that the substitution effect is more important than the 
income effect and that several countries have increased savings 
when a significant interest rate reform was undertaken (Lanyi 
and Saracoglu). One problem in resolving this issue is that many 
countries repress financial institutions and control interest 
rates so there is little information on which to make counter-
factual judgements. When interest rates have been liberalized, 
the adjustment has frequently been too small and short-lived to 
determine the true impact. 
The demand for loanable funds by financial institutions 
should be primarily determined by the demand for funds by 
creditworthy borrowers. There are several government policies, 
however, which influence this demand. First, governments license 
bank branches and frequently provide strong incentives for open-
ing rural branches. These incentives can encourage banks to 
expand their networks even though costs may be high relative to 
the deposits mobilized and loans made. Second, interest rates 
paid on deposits and charged on loans are usually fixed and 
frequently the authorized spread between deposit and lending 
rates is low, but quotas and targets are imposed to expand 
agricultural lending. Disincentives in the interest rate 
structure are often offset with cheap central bank rediscount 
funds so many institutions use this source to reach loan targets. 
Lenders often try to circumvent the intent of financial policies 
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by channeling mobilized funds from surplus to deficit areas which 
frequently are urban centers. 
The interest rate controls on loans creates a disequilibrium 
situation of excess demand for funds by borrowers so lenders must 
resort to nonmarket rationing of loans (Gonzalez-Vega). In this 
disequilibrium situation, changes in rural deposits associated 
with changes in deposit interest rates are likely to represent 
changes in the supply of funds to lenders up to the point where 
supply and demand for loanable funds is equated. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
An empirical model was developed to explain the supply of 
funds provided to deposit-taking institutions in rural areas in 
these four countries. The relation between rural deposits and 
the explanatory variables was specified as follows: 
D = F (Y,r,i,B) 
where D = nominal value of rural deposits, 
Y = agricultural GDP, 
r = nominal interest rate, 
i = rate of inflation, and 
B = number of bank branches/offices in rural areas. 
For the reasons given above, it was expected that agricultural 
GDP and number of branches will be positively related to deposits. 
All four countries have experienced nominal and real increases in 
agricultural GDP, although the growth rate has been fairly low in 
Nepal (World Bank, world Tables, 1983). The four countries have 
actively pursued the spread of banking services but by 1982/83 
- 6 -
the number of rural bank offices per 10 thousand habitants was 
still only 0.40 for India, 0.25 for Nepal, 0.45 for Pakistan, 
and a relatively high 1.07 for Sri Lanka. 
The expected sign for the interest rate variable was 
ambiguous. During the 1970-1981 period, real deposit rates of 
interest for twelve-month time deposits in India were negative 
for seven years, and for nine years in Pakistan (Fry). Some 
years these rates were a negative 3 to 5 percent. Real deposit 
rates in Nepal and Sri Lanka were also frequently negative, but 
became positive after they liberalized interest rate policies 
(1973 in Nepal and 1977 in Sri Lanka). Following reforms, rates 
generally varied in the positive 2 to 5 percent range with Sri 
Lanka tending to have the highest rates. Kim concluded that 
these reforms led to substantial increases in commercial bank 
saving deposits. 
The model was fitted to pooled time-series cross-section 
data covering the twelve years 1970-1981. Data on nominal 
interest rates, rural deposits and branches were obtained from 
four country studies by Joshi, Motwani, Quaraishi, and de Silva. 
There are some definitional differences the chief one being that 
the Sri Lankan series covers only rural banks and credit socie-
ties as no data exist on commercial bank deposits in rural 
areas. Rural deposits as a percent of total deposits rose fairly 
steadily in this period except in Sri Lanka. But even in India, 
which has the highest rural deposit share, rural deposits had 
risen to only a third of total deposits by 1981. 
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Estimates of real interest rates and expected inflation were 
taken from Fry. Data on agricultural GDP at constant factor 
cost, implicit GDP deflators, and official exchange rates were 
taken from the World Bank World Tables, 1983. Rural population 
estimates were obtained by interpolating population census data 
reported in various issues of the U.N. Demographic Yearbook. 
OLS regressions were run with various specifications of the 
basic model. F-tests wer.e applied to the residual sums of 
squares of models that included country dummy variables, and 
interactions between them and each of the explanatory variables. 
The hypothesis of overall homogeneity of the regression was 
rejected. Coefficients for the country dummy variable and inter-
action between the dummy variable and the branching variable were 
statistically significant. Because the disturbance terms were 
assumed to be cross-sectionally correlated and time-wise auto-
regressive, a modified version of the generalized least-squares 
(GLS) regression was used to obtain efficient parameter estimates. 
This is a two-step process wherein the first step adjusts for 
auto-correlation in each country and the second step adjusts for 
cross-section correlation. A per capita specification of the 
variables in real terms was used to control for scale effects 
across the countries. The model was estimated in double-log 
form so the coefficients of the independent variables could be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
Two empirical models were tested 
(1) lnD = ao + a1lnY + a2lnB + a3ln(r-i) + b1D1 
b2D2 + b3D3 + c31U1 + c32U2 + c33U3 
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where D = per capita real rural (demand and savings) deposits, 
y = per capita agricultural GDP at constant factor cost, 
r-i = real rate of interest on twelve-month time deposits, and 
B = number of bank branches/offices per thousand 
inhabitants in rural areas 
Di = 1, i = 1,2,3 for Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, respec-
tively, 0 otherwise. India was selected as the country 
of reference. 
Ui = DilnB, Di = dummy variable for the respective 
countries 
This model implies that households react directly to real 
interest rates. An alternative formulation permitted a differ-
ential response to changes in nominal rates and inflation. The 
response lag to changes in nominal rates might be shorter than 
the lag in response to changes in inflation because the latter 
are filtered through the process of expectation formulation 
(Saracoglu). Therefore, the second model was specified as 
follows: 
(2) ln D = ao + a 1lnY + a2lnB + a4lnr 
+ aslni + b1D1 + b2D2 + b3D3 
+ c31U1 + c32u2 + c33U3 
The sign for the coefficient of nominal interest rate was 
expected to be positive, while the sign for the inflation 
variable was expected to be negative. 
Table 1 presents the results of the generalized least 
squares regression for the two equations. The coefficients for 
all variables were of the predicted sign and all were statisti-
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TABLE 1. -- GLS ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF 
THE DEPOSIT FUNCTIONal 
Eguation (1) Eguation (2) 
Parameter Standard-
(Independent ized 
Variable) Estimate t-ratiob/ Estimate Estimate t-ratiob/ 
ao (intercept) -3.405 -7.855** -3.250 -7.440** 
al (lnY) 0.528 5.438** 0.200 0.620 4.309** 
a2 (lnB) 1.306 18.815** 1.991 1.303 19. 277** 
a3 (ln( r-i)) 1. 721 3.077** 0.056 
a4 (1n(r)) 0.056 0.580 
as (ln( i)) -0.012 -0.056 
bl (Dl) -4.243 -8.818** -1.776 -4.215 -9.048** 
b2 (Dz) -0.965 -1.165 -0.403 -0.915 -1.044 
b3 (D3) -3.385 -9.320** -1.416 -3.316 -9.383** 
c31 (U1= D11nB) -0.592 -4.709** -0.851 -0.587 -4.829** 
c32 cu2= D2lnB) -0.239 -1.387 -0.486 -0.222 -1.233 
c33 (U3= n31nB) -0.513 -1. 745* -0.180 -0.407 -1.249 
1{2 0.877 0.872 
F-Value 38.383** 33.115** 
a/ N=48. D1, D2, and D3, are dummy variables where D1 = 1 for 
Sri Lanka, 0 otherwise; Dz = 1 for Nepal, 0 otherwise; and 
D3 = 1 for Pakistan and 0 otherwise. 
b/ Levels of Significance: ** = 0.01; * = 0.10. 
Standard-
ized 
Estimate 
0.235 
1.986 
0.021 
-0.000 
-1.764 
-0.383 
-1.388 
-0.843 
-0.452 
-0.143 
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cally significant except the dummy variable for Nepal. The 
explanatory power of the models was high and the F-values for the 
regressions were significant. The elasticities for branches and 
real deposit rates were greater than one. A 10 percent increase 
in the number of rural branches is associated with a 13 percent 
increase in rural deposits, while a similar increase in real 
deposit rate is associated with a 17 percent increase in deposits. 
The income variable was less elastic with a value of 0.5. These 
results suggest that changes in the two financial variables could 
have a significant impact on rural deposits. The coefficients 
for the interaction variables between countries and branches were 
negative and significant for two of the three countries. When 
the branching coefficient was adjusted for country interaction, 
there was a tendency for lower branch elasticity to be associated 
with higher bank density. This is a logical result since the 
impact of additional branches on rural deposits should be lower 
when bank density is higher. 
The coefficients for the country dummy variables capture, 
among other things, the effect of different stages of financial 
deepening in these countries. In 1982, for example, the M2/GDP 
ratio for India was 0.426, compared to 0.264 for Nepal, 0.302 for 
Sri Lanka and 0.419 for Pakistan (Meyer and Esguerra). 
In the second model, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
for the common variables were similar and the explanatory power 
of the model was only slightly less than the first model. The 
coefficients for the interest rate and inflation variables had 
the expected sign but were insignificant. An F-test revealed 
- 11 -
they were not statistically different from each other, a con-
clusion which lends support to the first model which simply 
combined the two variables. This result suggests that rural 
depositors respond to real rather than nominal interest rates 
and that they do not formulate separate expectations of nominal 
interest rates and inflation. 
standardized regression coefficients were calculated to 
account for the differen~es in standard errors of the estimates, 
and to evaluate the relative importance of the explanatory 
variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld}. The beta coefficients show 
that changes in transaction costs represented by branch density 
are relatively more important than changes in agricultural GDP 
and real interest rates in explaining the variation in rural 
deposits in these fo•1r countries. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results of this study conformed to economic theory 
regarding the expected response of rural deposits to rural 
income, access to banking facilities and interest rates paid 
on deposits. The supply of rural deposits will increase as the 
agricultural GDP rises but there is little that can be done in 
the short term to accelerate deposits by raising income. However, 
government licensing of bank branches and controls over interest 
rates are two financial factors that can have a short term impact. 
Branching appears to have the greatest impact because of the 
effect that accessibility to banks has on transaction costs 
of deposits. The convenience factor in making and withdrawing 
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deposits swamps the impact of interest rates when the banking 
index is low. It is likely that the interest rate elasticity 
will rise once depositors have convenient access to banks. 
This study suggests that rural deposits can become an 
important source of funds for lending. Whether or not finan-
cial institutions can profitably mobilize these funds, however, 
depends on other financial policies such as lending interest 
rates, loan quotas and targets, and reserve requirements on 
deposits. If lending rates are fixed at low levels, if lenders 
are required to lend to activities with low interest rates, and 
if reserve requirements are high, lenders will be discouraged 
from the expensive task of expanding branches into the more 
sparsely settled or the lower income rural areas where the 
volume of deposits mobilized may be fairly low. Research is 
needed on the economics of rural banking to determine the 
appropriate policies and innovations required to make rural 
financial intermediation viable in the long run. 
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